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1. The survey is derived in 
part from Leeflang (1981). 
The marketing concept 
Broadly  speaking,  the  development  of 
marketing thought can be seen as a shift 
of  attention from self (producer, product) 
to other (customer, customer benefits). It 
developed from a focus on the product 
(roughly in the period 1900-1930),  via a 
focus on sales (1930-1950) to the so-called 
”marketing concept” (from 1950)l. This 
concept can be described as the notion 
that the desires and wants of  customers 
are focal and form the point of  departure. 
One  should  supply  products  with  the 
goal  of  providing  value for customers. 
This  requires  a  systematic  attempt  to 
evaluate one’s offering from the perspec- 
tive of  the envisaged publics. What are 
the needs of  the customer, and how does 
one satisfy them with product,  service, 
price,  distribution  and  communication, 
which  constitute  the  mix  of  marketing 
instruments. It  is in the interest of  the 
supplier to provide a product that satis- 
fies  demand  as closely  as possible,  be- 
cause to the extent that it does so better 
than a competing product,  it may com- 
mand a higher price relative to cost. Thus 
marketing requires a customer perspec- 
tive,  with an eye to the competition, to 
achieve a viable and profitable position in 
the market, with a fitting and consistent 
marketing mix. 
The  development  of  marketing  since 
the nineteen fifties is characterised by  a 
widening of scope in several respects: 
attention to the marketing not only of 
consumer goods but also of  products 
for industry,  and to the marketing of 
services 
attention to the marketing not only for 
profit but  also for non-profit organis- 
ations, including government 
increasing attention to the competitive 
environment,  market  structure,  and 
entrepreneurship,  with  associated 
strategic  aspects  of  marketing,  and 
their implications for market position 
in the longer term 
increasing attention to the demands of 
innovation under conditions of  rapid 
change  of  technology  and  markets, 
and the implications for cooperation 
integration  of  marketing  with  other 
functions in the firm. 
This widening of  scope, and the result- 
ing increase of  the impact of marketing 
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on society intensifies ethical questions. 
Principles of  conduct that yield little harm 
on the company level, may cross ethical 
boundaries  when applied  to the macro 
level  of  government.  Many people feel 
apprehensive  at the transition from the 
selling of  soap to the selling of  presiden- 
tial candidates and government policy. 
In marketing the notion of  ”exchange” 
has come to the fore as the corner stone 
of  theory. An increasing number of  theor- 
ists are seeing marketing no longer as a 
matter of  more or less isolated, discrete 
transactions, with a one-sided influencing 
of  one party by the other, but as an on- 
going process of  mutual influence in a 
two-sided relation. Here marketing is no 
longer  seen  as  a  ”technology  of  influ- 
ence”  but  as  a  ”social  process  of 
interaction”2. The  impulse  to  this  was 
formed partly from the broadening of  the 
marketing concept to “social marketing”, 
where  marketing  is  applied  to  govern- 
ment policy. The idea is that if  marketing 
is broadened in this way, the marketing 
concept must also be broadened towards 
a two-sided influencing. 
Despite its  professed  customer-orien- 
tation  the  ”marketing  concept”  had 
retained a mentality of  one-sided influ- 
ence. This appears, for example, in the 
key article “A Generic Concept of  Mar- 
keting” where Kotler (1972) laid the claim 
for a far-reaching extension of  the domain 
of  the  marketing  concept.  The  fourth 
axiom of  this  ”generic concept” was as 
follows:  ”Marketing  is  the  attempt  to 
produce the desired response by creating 
and  offering  values  to  the  market”. 
Kotler was criticised for this, particularly 
since the concept was also applied to the 
”selling” of  government goals, as part of 
”social marketing”. Tucker (1974, p. 32) 
put  it  this  way:  ”Generic marketing  is 
defined as an overt attempt to change the 
behavior  of  someone else  . . . the  old 
marketing  myopia  of  seeing the world 
from  the  channel  captain’s  seat,  con- 
tinues. The organisation is the marketer 
and  the  ‘publics’ are  merely  ’buyers’. 
This seems to have as its corollary the 
dictum that marketing theory need  not 
consider the public except as marketing 
targets”. To be fair, one should note that 
Kotler did leave room for mutual influ- 
ence (Kotler 1972, p. 49):  ”Mutual mar- 
keting  describes  the  case  where  two 
social  units  simultaneously  seek  a  re- 
sponse from each other”. Nevertheless, 
Tucker  had  a  point  in  that  “mutual 
marketing” had to be added as a special 
case.  Perhaps marketing should always 
be, or inherently is, mutual. 
’marketing 
should always 
e, or inherently  b 
is, mutual’ 
Marketing practice 
Apart from the theoretical debate, from 
a more practical perspective we see in- 
creasing  attention  being  paid,  in  both 
consumer  markets  and  markets  for  in- 
dustrial  products,  to  more  enduring 
exchange  relations  between  producers 
and  users,  rather  than  to  discrete,  in- 
cidental  transactions,  and  a  tendency 
towards more two-sided  interaction. In 
consumer markets this is due, in part, to 
a growing awareness that it is often more 
efficient, from a costlbenefit perspective, 
to maintain loyalty of  existing customers 
than to lure new customers. But to main- 
tain custom, one needs the customer to 
voice his or her complaints, as a partner 
in development and maintenance of  qual- 
ity;  as a source of  feedback rather than 
only a sink of  products.  In the termin- 
ology  of  Hirschman  (1970),  without  an 
outlet  for  the  exercise  of  “voice”,  the 
customer  will  ‘I exit  ’I  quietly , without 
offering the benefit  of  insight  into the 
causes of  their discontent.  In industrial 
markets, rapid change of  technology and 
global markets dictate a need for firms to 
differentiate products  and  at the  same 
time achieve a faster development of  new 
products and processes; to achieve a flex- 
ible and effective response to changing 
conditions of  demand and competition. 
This yields a need to contract out more 
activities. In the “make or buv” decision 
1 
2.  Cf.  Sweeney  (1972),  there  is  a  shift  to  “buy”,  and  to  a 
concentration  on  “core  activities”,  in  Houston  Gassenheimer 
order to build  UD and maintain the re-  ~87).  Dwver.  Schurr  & 
quired flexibility gnd speed of  response.  ~~~$j~~@;~l~8~~b 
Activities are contracted out even if  they  3, Transaction Cost Econ- 
are sDecific to the demands of  the user,  omics,  as  develoued  in 
and ire sensitive  to  defaults  or  aber- 
rations  in  design,  quality  and  supply. 
Particular  by  Wilfiamson 
(1975,  1985),  is  used  to 
studv  these  Droblems  of 
This makes both  the user and the sup-  traniactions  and ways  of 
plier  vulnerable to mishaps and o  pdr-  beyond  dealing with  the them!  scope but  of  it  the  is 
tunism on the part of  the partner  T:  . As  article todiscussit 
a  protection  against  this,  schemes  of  Ht  any length. 
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'prosperity 
requires division 
of  labour' 
4.  Cf.  Berger,  Noorder- 
haven,  Nooteboom  & 
Pennink (1991). 
5. Cf.  the concept of  the 
leading customer" of von 
Hippel (1988, 1989). 
6. For a discussion of  the 
implications of  information 
technology for transaction 
costs,  see  Nooteboom 
(1991a). 
7.  The  notion of  a "focal 
point" in agreements and 
bargaining  derives  from 
Schelling (1960). 
"governance"  (a  term  derived  from 
Williamson, 1985) can be devised, but a 
good design of  mutual advantage, repu- 
tation  for  competence and trustworthi- 
ness, and trust based on ongoing relations 
of  reciprocity form an indispensable part 
of  exchange4. Attention shifts from price 
to quality and service (including logistics); 
from  "static  efficiency"  (low  costs) to 
"dynamic  efficiency"  (innovative com- 
petence). Producers seek to involve users, 
and  users  seek  to  involve  suppliers, 
in the development of  new products, in 
order  to  speed  up  development  and 
introduction to market, and to reduce the 
risk  of  marketing misfits  and misfits in 
production and logisticss. 
There is  not only a demand for such 
changed  relations  between  producers 
and  users,  but  also  an opportunity  to 
implement and support them with infor- 
mation  and  communication  technology 
(telematics).  Telematic  links  between 
producers  and  users  are  available  to 
support and integrate ordering, invoicing 
and payment; to monitor transportation, 
stocks, and work in progress; to integrate 
product  design (CAD), the  design and 
planning of  production (CAM), and qual- 
ity control6. This technology can be used 
as a powerful instrument for one-sided 
control  and  regulation,  enforcing  the 
position of  "channel captains", but it can 
also  be  used  for  interaction  and  two- 
sided debate. 
The  emerging marketing practice  ap- 
pears to be stealing a march on theory. In 
this  article  we  consider  what  concepts 
may  lie behind  it,  and what  the impli- 
cations may be for ethics. 
Reciprocity in production 
Since Adam Smith, if  not before, we are 
aware that prosperity requires division of 
labour. Some people are better at some 
things than others,  if  not by  nature  or 
design,  then  by  training and  learning. 
When there is division of  labour, there is 
a surplus value in exchange, which equals 
the excess of  the highest price the buyer 
is willing to pay over the lowest price the 
seller is prepared to accept. There may be 
haggling over the division of  this surplus, 
but there is also room for give and take: 
one may willingly deviate from the "focal" 
point of  a fifty-fifty split, in order to help 
the other party,  and still obtain part of 
the surplus7. This is the principle of  what 
Macneil  (1986)  called  "specialized  reci- 
procity",  which  yields  "organic  soli- 
darity". The existence of  the surplus due 
to specialization creates a mutual demand 
for peace and trust, and hence solidarity, 
in  order  to  achieve  continuity,  when 
there are costs involved in breaking up 
the transaction relation. These costs are 
higher to the extent that the surplus due 
to specialization is  larger and there are 
costs  involved  in  switching to another 
source  or  user.  Note  that  a  tribe  of 
hunters may  collectively depend on ex- 
change  with  an  agricultural  tribe,  but 
individual hunters may switch exchange 
partners  in  the  agricultural  tribe,  and 
thereby evade commitments to solidarity. 
Thus  it  may  be  advantageous  to both 
tribes to centralize exchange and commit- 
ment  to  solidarity. This  is  one  of  the 
forces  that  gave rise to central govern- 
ment: in order to make solidarity collec- 
tive. Note also that the cost of  breaking 
up an exchange relation is larger when 
the  division  of  labour  not  merely  en- 
hances  efficiency,  as when  each of  the 
two sides could in principle conduct both 
production  activities  but  it  is  more  ef- 
ficient  to  specialize,  but  is  based  on a 
difference  in  competences  that  cannot 
easily be acquired. If  an agricultural tribe 
is not merely indisposed towards hunting 
but  incapable of  it  by  their build,  say, 
their dependence on exchange with the 
hunters  is  so  much  greater.  Thus  the 
demand for solidarity is related to differ- 
ences in the endowment of  competence. 
"Organic"  solidarity may be established 
by a give and take, according to relative 
conditions of  need and prosperity, in the 
space accorded by the exchange surplus, 
with both sides all the time still enhancing 
(though no longer maximizing) their own 
gains. 
We propose that the principle of  special- 
ized  reciprocity,  and the organic solid- 
arity associated with  it,  applies also to 
present  market  exchange.  We  should 
beware,  however,  not  to  make  market 
exchange seem too idyllic. When depen- 
dence is one-sided, the more autonomous 
and in that sense more powerful partner 
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may be in a position to appropriate the 
full surplus of  exchange, to the detriment 
or even destruction of  the more depen- 
dent partner. However, a reputation for 
such  conduct  will  discourage potential 
and attractive new partners to enter upon 
a  relationship.  When  dependence  is 
mutual, even if  it is not quite symmetric, 
it will often be in the common interest of 
an ongoing exchange relation to provide 
help, within the margin of  the surplus (or 
even  outside  it,  accepting  occasional 
loss). This may serve to accommodate a 
temporary mishap on the part of  the part- 
ner, or to compensate for risks taken in 
investments,  or  to allow for further in- 
vestment in improved competence. Large 
producers  may  use  their  power  with 
respect to small, specialized suppliers to 
squeeze their profits,  or to shift risks of 
excess  capacity  due  to  fluctuation  of 
demand, or to hive off  dirty, dangerous 
or low-skilled work. This is what people 
say is happening in Japan. On the other 
hand,  they  may  use  the  surplus from 
exchange to compensate for risks taken 
by  suppliers,  and  to  enhance  further 
development of  competence, thereby en- 
hancing the quality of  supply, which in 
the long run is in their own interest. This 
is what recently has been happening in 
Japan. 
The  analysis  applies  to  material  ex- 
change,  in  production,  but  may  also 
apply, though with requisite changes, to 
exchange of  knowledge and meaning. In 
present economic systems a crucial pro- 
duction factor is  knowledge. If  it  were 
the case that there can be cognitive dif- 
ferentiation, there would be advantages 
of  cognitive specialization, with a result- 
ing surplus in cognitive or symbolic ex- 
change  (communication).  This  would 
yield a second level of  exchange, in ad- 
dition to the level of  material exchange, 
with, perhaps, a corresponding extension 
of  specialized  reciprocity  and  organic 
solidarity. 
Reciprocity in knowledge 
In a diverse and changing world different 
people and different firms will  perceive 
and interpret things differently. This cog- 
nitive  differentiation calls  for  cognitive 
specialization. There  is  an  opportunity 
for cognitivelsemantic  reciprocity: it is by 
interaction with others that new knowl- 
edge is acquired and new meanings are 
created. Innovation often comes from the 
integration of  different areas of  experi- 
ence. It is by  bringing the perspectives 
and experiences of  suppliers, users and, 
more circumspectly, competitors into the 
firm that one achieves the efficiency in 
innovation that is required for survival. 
Many illustrations can be  given. Pro- 
ducers of  machinery, instruments, tools 
etc. need information from the perspec- 
tive  of  users,  not  only  on the  perfor- 
mance of  the product in its core function, 
but  also  on  its  ease  of  use,  training, 
installation, maintenance, diagnosis and 
repair of  break-downs, etc. A producer of 
packaging or containers needs to absorb 
the experience of  users under  different 
conditions of  transport, handling, stock- 
ing, in different countries with different 
climates, infrastructures, systems of  logis- 
tics. For a new product one needs inside 
information from  diverse user  contexts 
on possible obstacles to introduction, due 
to divergence from established routines 
and  vested  interests.  Information  is 
needed not just on the sales side but also 
on the supply side: attributes of  materials 
or components with respect to production, 
use and scrapping; future conditions of 
supply; emerging technologies, etc. 
If  this  reciprocity  in  perception  and 
knowledge matters now,  why didn't  it 
matter  so  much  before?  In  a  stable 
environment perceptions and interpret- 
ations  converge  to  a  more  or  less 
common perception and interpretation. If 
different agents perceive the world simi- 
larly they have less need for each other 
to complement their limited views. It is 
under  conditions  of  turbulence,  where 
different  contexts  yield  different  per- 
spectives,  that  one  needs  partners  in 
perception  and  interpretation  to  com- 
plement  one's  competence*.  In  other 
words: in such conditions there is a lower 
premium on autonomy, and a higher risk 
of  becoming imprisoned in outlived per- 
ceptions,  interpretations or  valuations. 
This  brings  us  back  to the  old  philo- 
sophical theme  of  the  master  and  the 
slave. Ultimately the master is the victim 
'Innova  tion 
often comes from 
the integration 
of  different areas 
of experience. ' 
8. Of course, if differences 
in  perception and  mean- 
ing are too large, and there 
is no intersubjective  order, 
communication  will fail. 
~ 
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‘All 
uncontestable 
power is bad  not 
only because it 
violates the 
interests of 
others but also 
because it defeats 
itself in its 
isolation. ’ 
9.  Elsewhere,  in  Noote- 
boom  (1991),  I  have 
employed  the  linguistic 
philosophy  of  Ferdinand 
de Saussure to explore this 
analogy. 
10. For  a well-known ac- 
count  of  the  multi-stage 
adoption  process,  see 
Rogers (1983). 
11. Horizontal cooperation 
at  a later stage may occur 
in  an  alliance  to  force 
a  market  standard, as in 
the  cooperation  between 
Philips and Sony to estab- 
lish the compact disc. 
of  his ability to set the terms and con- 
ditions of  the relation,  and to disregard 
the views of  the slave, because he thereby 
misses out on the opportunity  to learn 
and adapt. He is stifled in the isolation of 
his supremacy. Monopoly is bad not only 
because  it  yields  prices  which  are  too 
high,  and  monopsony  is  bad  not  only 
because  it  yields  prices  which  are  too 
low. All uncontestable power is bad not 
only because it violates the interests of 
others but also because it defeats itself in 
its isolation. 
A second, complementary and crucial 
factor is that cognitive reciprocation yields 
a greater need for continuity of  the ex- 
change relation,  for two reasons.  First, 
while cognitive reciprocation requires a 
difference  of  perception,  interpretation 
and evaluation, as a source of  novelty, it 
also requires a measure of  commonality, 
to  enable  communication.  A  model  of 
this is to be found before our noses, in 
ordinary language, which is a marvellous 
generator of  meaning in its combination 
of  intersubjective similarity and idiosyn- 
cratic diversityg. In relations of  specialised 
cognitive reciprocity it  requires time to 
establish bilateral linkage in meanings, in- 
terpretations and evaluations. In exchange 
relations  between  firms  this  includes 
knowledge of: priorities, preferences and 
competences on the part of  the partner; 
formal and informal organizational struc- 
ture  and  process;  whom  to  talk  with 
about what and in what terms;  how to 
establish links across technical interfaces 
and  to  utilize  complementarities.  This 
yields costs of  switching to a  different 
partner (where the investment in shared 
meanings and goals would  have  to be 
made again), and thereby puts a premium 
on continuity of  the exchange relation- 
ship. A second reason for a more lasting 
exchange relationship is that the process 
of  adopting new knowledge or technology 
from a partner is a process with several 
subsequent stages, and therefore requires 
timelo.  Note  that  the  two  reasons  we 
have  given for a relation  that  lasts for 
some  time  are  distinct  from  the  more 
elusive concept of  trust. With this I do 
not wish to deny a role for trust; on the 
contrary,  in  my  view  trust  is  part  of 
reciprocity,  and  indeed  of  communi- 
cation. What I wish to emphasize is that 
reciprocity  does  not  depend  only  on 
trust, and thereby becomes more solid. 
When we  consider cognitivelsemantic 
exchange, there are further differences as 
compared with material exchange. First, 
unlike material goods, with information 
one can have one’s cake and eat it too. 
Knowledge does not  diminish from its 
distribution.  If  I  tell  you  something,  I 
have not lost the knowledge of  it. Note, 
however,  that  in  some important cases 
proprietary knowledge gives an advan- 
tage,  as  for  example  in  the  case  of  a 
formula for a new drug. That is why in 
order to elicit innovation we need protec- 
tion against the diffusion of  knowledge, 
by patents or other means. But in vertical 
relations between producers and users the 
exchange of  information, when protected 
from horizontal leakage to competitors, is 
augmenting  rather  than  diminishing. 
Then,  since  no  loss  of  information  is 
involved in its distribution, the minimum 
price  of  supply may  be  zero,  whereby 
there is a surplus as soon as the receiver 
attaches any value to the information. In 
horizontal  relations,  specialized  reci- 
procity obtains only when the surplus is 
larger than the potential loss due to the 
surrender  of  proprietary  knowledge. 
Thus, horizontal exchange will  occur in 
stages of  development of  a more basic 
nature,  at  a distance from the stage of 
introduction to market”. 
Second, there is the problem (Arrow’s 
paradox of  information) that it is difficult 
to evaluate the worth  of  information if 
one does not already have it. This poses a 
problem for the selection of  partners for 
the exchange of  knowledge, to the extent 
that there are costs and time involved in 
setting up the contact and exploring its 
worth.  An  obvious  selection  device 
would be past innovative performance as 
a  supplier or  user.  A  good  reputation 
may generate trust: it serves to indicate 
the reliability of  the partner with respect 
to both the value of  the knowledge and 
competence that he offers and his will- 
ingness to offer a measure of  solidarity. 
Trust in solidarity can also be enhanced 
by shared experience, norms and values, 
friends, relatives etc. 
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Marketing ethics 
Ethics tends to be seen as the setting of 
boundaries  within  which  conduct  may 
take place. These boundaries are seen as 
imposed from outside;  from a realm of 
ethics  that  is  basically  a  nuisance  but 
must be taken into account, and must be 
shown to be taken into account, by re- 
sponsible citizens. A necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition for ethical conduct is 
a certain amount of  solidarity: the taking 
into account  of  the interest and expec- 
tations of  others, even if  it reduces one’s 
own gains. Solidarity entails the principle 
of  reciprocity: respect and lack of  manipu- 
lation with respect to others; respect for 
the freedom of  others to have and voice 
their own views;  modesty in claims of 
understanding  others and of  being able 
to decide what is best for them. The other 
(person, party) is  not  some object that 
can  be  controlled  and  used  as a  mere 
instrument,  but  a  person  with  hislher 
irreducible individuality and idiosyncracy , 
with  an  inalienable  right  to  voice  an 
opinion and thereby have an impact on 
us. People are not mere objects, but cog- 
nitively  and  morally  transcendent,  and 
thereby constitute sources of  agency and 
“voice“12.  In  human  affairs  in  general 
and  marketing  in  particular,  one-sided 
influence is bad from an ethical perspec- 
tive. This ethical stance may suggest that 
the  opposition  against  marketing  as  a 
process of  one-sided influence stems from 
a humanistic sense of  justice, democracy 
and human  dignity: users  (consumers) 
should  be  able  to  influence  producers 
(and government) to avoid manipulation. 
That  certainly  is  a  valid  source  of 
opposition. But the point of  the present 
article is that one-sided influence is also 
bad marketing. 
Solidarity and the enhancement of  own 
gains  do  not  necessarily  exclude  each 
other,  even in  the economic sphere of 
material  exchange.  Market  exchange is 
based on division of  labour which yields 
a surplus of  value, which provides a need 
and a basis for “organic” solidarity. The 
surplus may be used to implement solid- 
arity, in the joint interest of  an ongoing, 
productive exchange relationship. 
In addition to the surplus in material 
exchange, as a result of  specialization, an 
argument  for  reciprocity  in  marketing 
arises for  epistemological and linguistic 
reasons. There is surplus also in the ex- 
change of  knowledge and meaning. It is 
bad  marketing to presume to know all 
there  is  to know  about customers and 
competition,  and to ignore the sources 
of  criticism  and  ideas from customers, 
suppliers and competitors. To do this is 
to miss  the benefit  of  the idiosyncratic 
views  and experience of  customers and 
competitors; to miss the benefit of  their 
voice. This matters because thereby one 
deprives oneself of  access to fresh views 
and competences outside one’s own per- 
spective,  and thereby  gets  locked  into 
one’s own bias. Like words, products do 
not have a meaning or use value by them- 
selves but obtain it only in use, in inter- 
action  with  other  (complementary  or 
substitutive) products. To turn a deaf ear 
to the voice of  others in the presumption 
of  knowing what is good for them is to 
put oneself out of  the game. If  a producer 
shuts himself  off  from the influence of 
others he loses his marketing identity. It 
is by two- or many-sided influence, in a 
nexus of  market relations,  that one ob- 
tains the perception and understanding 
required to make  sense in the market. 
Marketing  is  fully  effective  only  if  it 
endorses the principle of  reciprocity,  in 
order to mobilize agency and voice, to the 
mutual advantage of  user and producerl3. 
Every  marketing action should have an 
action in reverse direction; as in mech- 
anics,  so  in  marketing,  action  should 
equal reaction. Product-design is not just 
the provision  of  functions to users but 
also the embodiment of  their response. 
Price is not something added to cost but 
the  division  of  a  surplus in  exchange. 
Communication is empty if  it is not two- 
sided;  meaning  is  not  given  prior  to 
communication but derives from it. Dis- 
tribution  serves  not  only  to  facilitate 
access of  the buyer to the product, but 
also to facilitate access of  the supplier to 
the customer’s response. 
We  conclude that the principle of  reci- 
procity  does not go against marketing, 
and marketing should not go against it. 
One-sided influence in marketing is not 
only unethical but unproductive, from the 
perspective of  both user and producer 0 
‘one-sided 
influence is also 
bad marketing 
12.  This  view  has  been 
inspired,  in  part,  by  the 
philosophy  of  Immanuel 
Levinas (1961). 
13. For  an elaboration of 
the argument,  see Noote- 
boom (1991b). 
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